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The law surrounding third party nuclear liability is important to all parties 
in the nuclear supply chain whether they are providing decommissioning 
services, project management expertise or a new reactor. This paper 
examines third party nuclear liability, and in particular, in relation to a 
Supplier in the nuclear energy sector in the United Kingdom (UK). The 
term “Supplier” is used in this paper and, depending on the context, is 
intended to cover all parties in the supply chain providing services, 
equipment or technology (e.g. the EPC contractor, the reactor vender, 
the owner engineer, architect engineer, or the Parent Body Organisation 
responsible for decommissioning one the UK legacy nuclear 
installations). 
With a return to nuclear new build expected in the UK, the clarification of 
the position of a Supplier and their potential to be liable for nuclear 
damage is of vital importance for a functioning nuclear supply chain. The 
research explores the nuclear liability legislation in the UK and identifies 
the gaps and limitations in existence. The latter problems pose a risk for 
the Suppliers to operators in the nuclear energy industry, and 
consequently some approaches that can mitigate those risks are 
advanced and assessed. The nuclear liability regime in the UK is largely 
based on international conventions and hence, the risks posed to the 
Supplier in the UK also exist for Suppliers in other 
countries. There are resource shortages already in the 
nuclear energy industry, and currently the Supplier to the 



















be resolved and a new legal definition of nuclear damage enacted. 
Further, the level of liability exposure for a UK Supplier involved in a 
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nuclear  supply  chain  whether  they  are  providing  decommissioning  services,  project 
management  expertise  or  a  new  reactor.  This  paper  examines  third  party  nuclear 
liability,  and  in particular,  in  relation  to a Supplier  in  the  nuclear energy sector  in  the 
United Kingdom (UK). The term “Supplier” is used in this paper and, depending on the 
context,  is  intended  to  cover  all  parties  in  the  supply  chain  providing  services, 
equipment  or  technology  (e.g.  the  EPC  contractor,  the  reactor  vender,  the  owner 
engineer,  architect  engineer,  or  the  Parent  Body  Organisation  responsible  for 
decommissioning one the UK legacy nuclear installations)..  
 
With a  return  to nuclear new build  expected  in  the UK,  the  clarification of  the 
position  of  a  Supplier  and  their  potential  to  be  liable  for  nuclear  damage  is  of  vital 
importance  for  a  functioning  nuclear  supply  chain.  The  research  explores  the  nuclear 
liability  legislation  in  the UK  and  identifies  the  gaps  and  limitations  in  existence.  The 
latter problems pose a risk for the Suppliers to operators in the nuclear energy industry, 
and  consequently  some  approaches  that  can  mitigate  those  risks  are  advanced  and 


























that any nuclear operation carries with  it:  (1)  large capital costs;  (2)  long term 
storage and disposal of waste  issues;  (3) potential nuclear proliferation  issues; 
and (4)  the potential  for causing accidental nuclear damage  that  is widespread 
and catastrophic where no one company, including insurance companies, would 





or  geographical  borders”.3  This  has  been  demonstrated  by  a  past  nuclear 
incident,  the  Chernobyl  disaster.4  In  recognition  of  the  trans‐boundary 
consequences,  a  “patchwork  of  diverse  legal  regimes”5  on  third  party  liability 
was  established.  These  international  conventions  are  applicable  to  all 
participants in the nuclear industry and third parties who could be affected by a 
nuclear  incident.  The  national  laws  are  shaped  and  influenced  by  these 
international conventions6 and countries either implement legislation to comply 
with  the  regime  contained  in  the  international  instruments;  or  where  the 













4  This  research  predates  the  Fukushima  incident  in  Japan  in  March  2011.  In  1986  a  nuclear 
disaster  at  Chernobyl  resulted  in  widespread  environmental  and  human  health  consequences 
(INES 7), and examples of other disasters are: a large off‐site release at Kyshtym which resulted 
in  evacuation  of  the  local  area  (INES  6);  the  1957 Windscale  accident when  radioactivity was 
released and restrictions placed on consuming food produced locally (INES 5); the core/reactor 
damage  at  Three Mile  Island  (INES  5);  and  the  violation  of  safety  procedure  at  Tokai Mura  in 
Japan which resulted in two deaths (INES 4).  
5 This  is explored  in detail  in: DG Tren, European Commission, 2005. TREN/CC/01‐2005, Legal 
Study for the Accession of Euratom to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of 













It  was  clear  from  an  early  stage  that  the  trans‐boundary  consequences  of  a 
nuclear  incident  could  result  in  damages  being  paid  from  the  host  country  to 
many countries. In recognition of this exposure to trans‐boundary damages, the 
international conventions were drafted resulting in seven key principles  in this 
















Convention.  It  is a  regional convention with all  its  fifteen contracting countries 
being  Western  European  countries.  The  Paris  Convention  requires  national 
legislation  to  be  passed  in  order  for  it  to  be  ratified  and  it  is  based  on  the 
aforementioned seven principles: 
 
The Paris Convention sets out the factors that have to be present for the 
Operator to be liable. Article 3a) provides that the Operator of a nuclear installation 
shall be liable for nuclear damage upon proof that such damage was caused by a 
nuclear incident in such installation or involving nuclear substances coming from 
such installation. There are however some key exceptions in the Paris Convention that 
would result in the Operator being relieved from its liability. The first is nuclear 
damage caused by a nuclear incident directly due to an act of armed conflict, 




Convention  Relating  to  Civil  Liability  in  the  Field  of  Maritime  Carriage  of  Nuclear  Material 
(1971); and The Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships (1962) ‐ this 
latter  Convention  has  not  yet  entered  into  force.  However,  a  brief  background  on  the  Joint 
Protocol and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation are included in Appendix B. 
10  Paris  Convention  on  Third  Party  Liability  in  the  Field  of  Nuclear  Energy  (29  July  1960),  as 
amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, by the Protocol of 16 November 1982 
and by the Protocol of 12 February 2004 (the final Protocol is not yet in force). The countries that 
have  ratified  the  Paris  Convention  are:  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece, 
Italy,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden,  Turkey  and  United  Kingdom. 






hostilities, civil war or insurrection.11 This exoneration is on the basis that the nation 
would be responsible for the consequences of a civil war or other armed conflict. It 
should be noted that “this clause has been interpreted from time immemorial as not 
granting exemption for acts of terrorism, on whatever scale.”12 Following the 11 
September attacks, the insurance industry requested Article 9 to be reviewed but in 
“the final analysis terrorism will remain covered by the conventions.”13 Another is 
where nuclear damage is caused by a nuclear incident directly due to a grave natural 
disaster of an exceptional character (unless national law provides otherwise), 
although the 2004 Paris Protocol removed “the exoneration for natural disasters.”14  
The court may also relieve the Operator “wholly or partly” from paying 
compensation, in the event that the Operator can prove that nuclear damage was 
caused or contributed to by the person suffering damage whether from that person’s 
“gross negligence…or from an act or omission of such person done with intent to 
cause damage”.  
 
Importantly for the Supplier, the Operator is not liable for nuclear damage (1) 
to the installation itself including a nuclear installation under construction, on the site 
where that installation is located. The Exposé des Motifs provides that the purpose of 
this exemption is to avoid the Operator’s financial security, (normally insurance) 
“from being used principally to compensate damage to [the] installation to the 
detriment of third parties”;15 or (2) caused to any property on the site of the nuclear 
installation which is used in connection with the nuclear installation. The property 
would normally fall into two categories: (a) the Operator’s property. The Operator 
would not have any action for compensation against itself for damage to its own 
property (e.g. a person cannot sue himself).16 The Operator is also in a position insure 
loss of or damage to the nuclear installation since almost “all pools…see it as their 
task to provide cover for [nuclear] installations…[and] nuclear insurance responds to 
the full definition of a nuclear installation in the international liability conventions”;17 
(b) the Supplier’s property. Likewise, Suppliers “whose property is on the site of a 
nuclear installation are obliged to assume the risks of loss or damage thereto, and they 
too are able to include the cost of this risk in the price of their supply contracts.”18 
 
There are a number of activities and materials that fall outside the scope of 
the  Paris  Convention.    The  obvious  gap  is  that  the  Paris  Convention  does  not 
apply  to  either  damage  suffered  or  a  nuclear  incident  in  a  non‐convention 
                                                 
11 Article 9 of the 2004 Protocol states: “The operator shall not be liable for nuclear damage caused by 
a nuclear incident directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, or insurrection.” 
12 Desart, R.D., (2006) “The reform of the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy and of the Brussels Supplementary Convention – An overview of the main features of 
the modernisation  of  the  two Conventions”  from  the  Joint  Report  by  the  NEA  and  the  IAEA  on 
“International Nuclear Law in the Post­Chernobyl Period”, p.231.  
13 Desart, R.D., supra note 22 at p.219. 




15Exposé des Motifs, paragraph 40: [Online: Accessed between December 01 2010 – February 28th 







country.  However,  there  are  a  number  of  other  activities  and  materials  that 
typically  fall  outside  the  Paris  Convention.  Firstly,  activities  or  materials 
involving low levels of radioactivity. They include (1) “uranium mining or milling 
or  the  manufacture  [storage]  and  processing  of  natural  or  depleted  uranium” 
which do not present any criticality risk to the public at large;19 (2) installations 
where  small  amounts  of  fissionable  materials  are  found  (including  research 
reactors  and  particle  accelerators);20  or  (3)  radioisotopes  used  in  medicine, 
education  and  industry which pose much  less  of  a  risk  are  covered by normal 
civil liability regimes; or (4) uranium salts that are “used incidentally in various 
industrial  activities  not  related  to  the  nuclear  industry.”21  In  addition  to  low 
levels  of  radioactivity,  non‐peaceful  operations  such  as military  installations  or 
facilities  are  also  outside  the  scope  of  the  Paris  Convention.  It  is  also  worth 
noting  that  the  nuclear  fusion  installations  do  not  currently  benefit  from  the 
general  principles  of  the  international  regime.  As  a  result,  any  Operator  of  an 
installation  resulting  from  the  ITER  projects  in  France  is  not  covered  by  the 
international  liability  regime and  they  risk being  exposed  to unlimited nuclear 
liability that cannot be insured.22  Pessimists might argue that there was a “lack 




The consequence of legal channelling of liability to the Operator is that 
victims of nuclear incident do not need to prove that the Operator is negligent or at 
fault. The victims simply need to prove a connection between the nuclear damage and 
the nuclear incident. This principle removes the need for Suppliers to take out nuclear 
liability insurance. However, the Paris Convention provides the Operator with a right 
of recourse in two limited situations. The first is where the Operator has a right of 
recourse if the damage caused by a nuclear incident results from an act or omission 
done with intent to cause damage, against the individual acting or omitting to act with 
such intent. The Exposé des Motifs make it clear that this right of recourse is limited 
to rights against individual persons who act or omit to act with intent to cause 
damage. The Paris Convention is not intended to provide a right of recourse against 
the employing company. The employer cannot therefore be held liable when its 
employee acts or omits to act with intent to cause damage. The second is where 
Operator has a right of recourse if and to the extent that it is so provided expressly by 
contract. The position set out in the Paris Convention is clear and any Supplier should 
be aware of the consequences. The basic position is that any Supplier would not be 







22  Grammatico‐Vidal,  2009:  103.  Grammatico‐Vidal,  L.  2009.  The  International  Thermonuclear 
Experimental Reactor (ITER) International Organisation: Which Laws Apply to this International 
Nuclear Operator? Nuclear Law Bulletin, 2009, 2. 
23  Desart  (2006:  239):  Desart,  R.D.  2006.  The  reform  of  the  Paris  Convention  on  Third  Party 
Liability  in  the  Field  of  Nuclear  Energy  and  of  the  Brussels  Supplementary  Convention  –  An 





held liable to the Operator for damage resulting from the goods or services that it 
provides even if it is negligent or at fault. However, if there is a clause in the contract 
between the Supplier and the Operator allowing the Operator to have a right of 
recourse against the Supplier in the event the goods or services being faulty or where 
the Supplier was negligent, the Supplier would be exposed to claims from the 
Operator. It should be noted that this does not remove the Operator’s liability to third 
parties; it purely provides the Operator with the right to pursue the Supplier for its 
negligent or faulty deliverables. The Supplier can therefore decide whether it agrees 
that the Operator has a right of recourse and if so can limit the extent of that right. For 
example, liability being limited the contact value with the costs above such limit 





Amend  the  Brussels  Supplementary  Convention  2004 were  prepared  with  the 
“aim  to  make  more  money  available  to  compensate  more  victims  for  more 
damage  than  ever  before”.25  The  drivers  for  the  2004  Paris  Protocol  resulted 
from  the  type  of  losses  claimed  in  relation  to  Chernobyl  e.g.  loss  of  turnover, 
crops,  animals,  fish,  costs  of  reinstating  the  environment  (i.e.  cost  of  re‐
introducing  a  certain  species  of  fish  into  a  contaminated  river),  or  loss  of  an 
economic  interest  in  enjoying  the  environment  (hotel  owner  losing  income). 
These  types  of  loss  were  not  caught  by  the  limited  definition  of  “nuclear 
damage”. Paris Convention representatives began their discussions to amend the 
Paris Convention in 1998 and concluded that “while the regime was viable and 
sound,  it  was  in  need  of  improvement”26.  The  contracting  states  to  the  Paris 





The most  important  changes  to  the Paris Convention  include  the  position 
that the Operator and the state will have increased liability and victims will have 
access to larger amounts of compensation. The key enhancement under the 2004 
Brussels Protocol  is  the substantial  increase  to  the  three  tiers of  compensation 
with  the  total  compensation  available  equating  to €1.5  billion.  The  2004 Paris 
Protocol  recognises  that  countries  can  have  unlimited  liability  but  the 
corresponding  unlimited  financial  security  will  not  be  available.  The  Operator 
must  then maintain  financial security at a  lower amount. Under  the 2004 Paris 
Protocol  the minimum  requirement  is  €700 million.  The  second  key  change  is 




























will  apply  to nuclear damage suffered  in non‐convention countries where such 
country (i) is a party to the Vienna Convention (and both countries are parties to 
the Joint Protocol30); or (ii) does not have any nuclear installations; or (iii) has its 
own  nuclear  liability  law  which  affords  equivalent  reciprocal  benefits  and  is 
based  on  principles  identical  to  those  of  the  Paris  Convention. This  however 
leaves the risk that a claimant in a non‐nuclear country can still make a tortious 
claim against  an Operator  in  the non‐nuclear  country’s  courts.  This problem  is 
elevated if the Operator has a presence or assets in such non‐nuclear country.  
 
Finally,  the  limitation  period  has  been  extended  to  allow  victims  to  have 
more  time  in which  to make  their  claims.  The  revised  period  is  now  consistent 
with  the  Vienna  Convention.  In  the  event  a  victim  wishes  to  take  an  action 
against the Operator, it would be barred from taking the action (a) in respect of 
loss  of  life  and  personal  injury,  if  thirty  years  from  the  date  of  the  nuclear 
incident  has  expired;  and  (b)  in  respect  to  other  nuclear  damage,  if  ten  years 









                                                 
28  “Nuclear  damage”  is  uniformly  defined  and  is  the  most  far  reaching  change  with  a  new 
definition contained in Article B.vii) of the 2004 Protocol. The definition of nuclear damage in the 
2004 Paris Protocol is almost identical to the definition in the Vienna Convention. 




Gaps  in  the  Nuclear  Liability  Conventions  and  an  Analysis  of  How  an  Actual  Claim  would  be 







The  main  purpose  of  the  Brussels  Convention31  is  to  increase  the  amount  of 
cover  in  the  event  of  a  nuclear  incident.  It was  adopted by  the majority  of  the 
Paris Convention states in 1963. The Brussels Convention operates alongside the 





two  ‐ compensation would be paid from the  installation country’s public  funds; 










but  these  principles  are  “moulded  in  different  liability  rules  (differences  in 
liability amounts, membership, territorial scope, rules on conflict of jurisdiction, 
settlement  of  disputes  and  subrogation,  etc.)”.35  One  of  the  criticisms  of  the 
Vienna Convention relates  to the US$5m minimum limitation on the Operator’s 
liability.  The  US$  referred  to  in  this  Convention  is  however  a  unit  of  account 
equivalent to the value of the US$ in terms of gold on 29 April 1963 ‐ US$35 per 
one troy ounce of fine gold. The true amount is now a lot higher and based on the 
                                                 
31 The full title is: Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 
July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 
November  1982.  It  entered  into  force  in  1974  and  the  following  countries  are  a  party  to  the 
Brussels  Convention:  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands, 
Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland 
have signed it but not in force. 
32  Pelzer  (2010:  368):  Pelzer,  N.  2010.  “Main  Features  of  the  Revised  International  Regime 




Bulgaria,  Cameroon,  Chile,  Croatia,  Cuba,  Czech  Republic,  Egypt,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia, 
Lebanon,  Lithuania, Mexico, Montenegro,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Peru,  Philippines,  Poland,  Republic  of 
Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent &  the Grenadines, Senegal, Serbia, Slovak 
Republic,  The  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Ukraine  and 
Uruguay. 
34 The Vienna Convention refers to absolute liability in paragraph IV (1). The term “strict liability” 
may have been more  appropriate,  since  it  simply  refers  to  liability without  fault  and  the  term 







gold  price  in  September  2010,  this  equates  approximately  to  US$180m.36  The 









the ability  to  sue  third parties.  It  is  clear  that  the  international  regime has not 
created legal unity but has created a patchwork pattern of diverse legal regimes. 






























                                                 
36 Schwartz, 2010: 320. Supra note 9. 
37 In October 2010, SDR 300m amounted to approximately £300m or €340m or US$475m. SDR 
means  Special  Drawing  Rights  which  is  based  on  a  basket  of  currencies,  as  defined  by  the 
International Monetary Fund, consisting of euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling and U.S. dollar. The 
basket of currencies is reviewed every five years. The US dollar equivalent of SDR is posted daily 
on  the  IMF  website:  [Online:  Accessed  between  December  01  2010  –  February  28th  2011: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx] 



















The  national  law  in  the  UK  for  nuclear  liability  can  be  found  in  the  Nuclear 
Installations Act  1965  as  amended  by  the Nuclear  Installations  Act  1969  (“the 
Act”).44  The  Act  reflects  the  regime  in  the  Paris  Convention  and  the  Brussels 
Convention.  Under  the  Act,  the  Operator45  is  liable  for  the  consequences  of  a 
nuclear  incident46 on the site and during transport  for which  it holds a nuclear 
site licence. 
 
Principle  1:  Strict  Liability  of  the  Operator  ­  section  7(1)  of  the  Act 
imposes  a  strict  statutory  duty  on  the  Operator.  47  This  section  reflects  the 








this  section  causes  injury  to  any  person  or  damage  to  any  property  of  any 
person  other  than  the  licensee,  being  injury  or  damage  arising  out  of  or 
resulting  from the radioactive properties, or a combination of  those and any 
toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties, of that nuclear matter; and 






















Ch  289  that  the  Act  was  a  clear  example  of  legislation  which  contains  strict  liability.  In 
Magnohard  v UKAEA  [2004] Counsel  for  the UKAEA  stated  that  “Act  1965  imposed  strict  civil 
liability for breach of a specified duty. 
48 Temple, et al. (2006: 449): Temple, R., Penny, C., and Sullivan, M. A. 2006. Liability for Nuclear 







it  constructs or operates a nuclear reactor or  installation  for  the production or 
use  of  atomic  energy,  or  any  ancillary  process which  involves  the  emission  of 
ionising radiations, the storage, processing or disposal of nuclear fuel. However, 
the  inclusion  of  these words  in  section  7  suggests  that  the  Operator  does  not 
have any duty under section 7 unless a nuclear site licence has been issued. This 
suggests  that  where  the  Operator,  for  whatever  reason,  is  not  issued  with  a 





approach,  the  outcome  is  the  same  in  that  the  Operator  is  strictly  liable  for 
nuclear damage. The claimant must therefore prove injury to persons or damage 
to  property  to  establish  a  breach  by  the  Operator  of  its  statutory  duty.  This 
section  creates  a new concept  of  the  “licensee” whereas  the  equivalent  term  in 
the  Paris  Convention  is  the  Operator.  Section  3(1)  sets  out  that  a  nuclear  site 
licence shall not be granted to any person other than a body corporate and shall 
not be transferable.49 Section 4 allows the Health and Safety Executive to place 
conditions  on  the  licensee  as  it  sees  fit  but  generally  in  relation  to  safety  and 
security. 
 
    Subsection 7(1)(a) imposes a strict  liability on the Operator in the event 
of  an occurrence50  involving nuclear matter51  from  its  licensed  site where  such 
nuclear  matter  causes  injury  or  damage.  The  section  largely  reflects  the 
definition of “nuclear incident” in the Paris Convention and strict liability means 
that there is no need to prove negligence. The word “occurrence”  is given more 
meaning  in  section  7(2)  which  sets  out  that  it  needs  (a)  to  involve  nuclear 
matter; (b) whilst on the nuclear licensed site; and (c) occur during the period of 
the Operator’s responsibility. Section 7(2) goes on to outline other occurrences 
elsewhere  than  on  the  licensed  site  that  involves  nuclear  matter  that  is  not 
“excepted matter”.52 There  is no  liability under the Act  for carriage of excepted 





50  The  term  “occurrence”  is  defined  in  the Act  (section  26)  but  only  in  the  context  of  sections 
16(1) and (1A), 17(3) and 18 of the Act and not in relation to section 7. The court in Magnohard v 
UKAEA  [2004]  have  however  held  that  the  term  should  be  given  in  ordinary  Oxford  English 
Dictionary meaning as "something that occurs, happens, or takes place; an event, incident." 











matter.  Subsection  7(1)(b)  refers  to  “no  ionising  radiations  emitted”  which 
reflects  an  equivalent  section  from  the  Nuclear  Installations  (Licensing  and 
Insurance)  Act  1959.  Unlike  section  7(1)(a),  it  relates  to  an  “emission”  rather 
than  an  “occurrence”.  The  Operator  is  strictly  liable  under  section  7(1)(b)(ii) 
whenever waste is discharged from the site even if it was negligently discharged 
by a  third party. The Operator’s  liability under section 7(1)(b)(i) appears to be 
slightly  different.  The  presence  on  the  site  of  the  emitting  ionising  radiations 
must  have  been  “caused  or  suffered”  by  the  Operator.  In  the  event  that  the 
Operator  (or  a  party  working  under  its  control)  did  not  bring  a  radioactive 
source onto the site and the Operator was unaware of its presence, the Operator 
would not be  liable  for  the damage caused by the radioactive source. However, 
the  Operator would  be  strictly  liable  for  the  emission  taking  place  on  the  site 
once it is aware of the presence of the ionising radiations.53   
 
















      Similarly,  the other key  theme  is  “damage  to any property”. There have 
been a number of cases where the judge had held that the Operator breached its 
duty imposed under section 7(1). In Blue Circle,56 the Court of Appeal concluded 
that  the  contamination  of  the  marshland  (from  overflowing  ponds  containing 
plutonium  from  the  neighbouring  AWE  site)  was  an  "occurrence  involving 
nuclear matter" within section 7(1)(a).  It was held that there had been damage 
to property by  radioactive material  and  the  consequences were economic. The 
                                                                                                                                            
may  be  prescribed  (or,  for  the  purposes  of  the  application  of  this  Act  to  a  relevant  foreign 
operator, as may be excluded from the operation of the relevant international agreement by the 
relevant foreign law). 













clear  that  the  estate  was  less  saleable  and  less  valuable  at  least  until  the 
contaminated  soil was  excavated. The Court  also  considered  the  possibility  for 





Circle  was  entitled  to  recover  all  losses  caused  by  the  damage  which  were 
reasonably  foreseeable  and  not  too  remote.  In  Magnohard58  the  claimants 
alleged that their property had been damaged by radioactive particles found on 
their  land near  the UKAEA nuclear  power  station  at Dounreay.  Similar  to Blue 
Circle, the radioactive particles had been intermingled with sand. The court held 





on  the  site  is  deemed  to  be  the  property  of  the  Operator,  the  duty  does  not 
extend to the Supplier’s property. Section 7(3)(b)(i) and (ii)  set out that it does 






“no  other  liability  shall  be  incurred  by  any  person  in  respect  of  that  injury  or 
damage”. The effect of these words is to channel such liability exclusively to the 
Operator.  It  is  important to note, from a Supplier’s perspective, that there is no 
section  7  duty  under  the  Act  where  the  Operator’s  property  is  damaged.  This 
importance  is  emphasised  by  section  7(3)  which  results  in  the  Supplier’s 
property, when on the licensed site, being deemed to be the Operator’s property. 
Section 12(2)  restricts  the ability  for a  claimant  from bringing  common  law or 
tortious  actions.  This  appears  to  provide  some  additional  protection  for  a 
Supplier.  Say,  for  example,  the  Supplier  negligently  caused  a  nuclear  incident 
which in turn caused a fire at the nearby administration offices (i.e. non‐nuclear 
damage),  compensation  for  any  injury  or  damage  caused  by  the  fire would  be 
recoverable  under  the Act.  However,  section  12(2)  is  subject  to  section  12(3). 
This  section  provides  that where  any  injury  or  damage  is  caused  (a)  partly  in 





Principle  3:  Compulsory  Financial  Security  ­  it  is  important  that  the 
Operators  have  sufficient  funds  to  cover  any  liability  they  may  have  to  third 







at  all  times  to  ensure  that  any  claims which have been  established  against  the 
Operator  by  virtue  of  section  7  are  satisfied.  There  are more  than  thirty  civil 




Principle 4: The Operator’s Limitation of Liability  in Time  ­  it  is  clear 
that some injuries (e.g. forms of cancer or genetic damage in future generation) 
may not manifest  themselves  for many years  from  the exposure  to  radioactive 
material. Section 16(3) means that any claims outside a ten‐year period but less 
than  thirty‐years  from  the  nuclear  incident,  should  be  made  against  the 
Government.  This  appears  to  have  been  a  balance  between  the  insurers  and 
Operators on the one hand and the duration for injuries to manifest themselves 
on  the  other.60  Any  claim will  be  statute  barred  if made  at  any  time  after  the 





future  generation  and  contamination may  last  for  several  hundred  years.  This 
suggests  a  limitation  period  which  runs  from  the  date  the  injury  or  damage 
manifests itself. 
 
Principle  5:  The  Operator’s  Limitation  of  Liability  in  Amount  ­  the 
Operator’s  limitation  on  its  liability  is  contained  in  section  16  of  the  Act.  This 
section sets out the Operator’s maximum liability per occurrence is £140 million 
and  £10 million  for  certain  prescribed  sites.  This  sum  has  been  in  place  since 
1994.62 The amounts of maximum liability have,  from a historical context, been 
fixed  at  amounts  equal  to  the maximum  level  of  the  insurance  available  to  the 
Operators.63  This  is  likely  to  be  increased  to  approximately  £600m64 with  the 
amendments implementing the 2004 Paris/Brussels Protocol. This is expected to 
be  implemented  in  the UK during 2012. Any claims  for amounts exceeding  the 
Operators maximum  liability  would  need  to  be made  against  the  Government 
and paid from public funds. The Government is currently required to meet claims 
up  to  SDR175m  and  for  claims  between  SDR175m  and  SDR300m  the 






61  The  relevant  date means  (i)  the  date  of  the  occurrence which  gave  rise  to  the  claim or,  (ii) 
where that occurrence was a continuing one, or was one of a succession of occurrences all caused 








compensation would  be  recovered  from  a  pool  contributed  to  by  the  Brussels 
Convention signatory states. A disadvantage for victims with this principle is that 
third parties (e.g. Suppliers and regulators), who may normally be  liable under 




in  foreign  courts  are  dealt  with  under  section  17,  which  ensures  that  the  UK 
approach is consistent with the Paris Convention. Section 17(1), provides that no 




with  the  issue  of  enforcing  judgements  in  the  UK  that  have  been made  in  the 
courts of another Paris Convention territory.  
 
Principle  7: Applicable  Law  and Non­Discrimination  of  Victims  ­  the 







It  is  likely  the  amendments  will  be  enacted  in  2012.66  These  changes  will  be 
made to implement the amendments to the Paris and Brussels Convention. The 
UK Government signed the 2004 Paris Protocol which results in some significant 
changes  to  the  nuclear  third  party  liability  regime.  The  Department  of  Energy 
and Climate Change (“DECC”) issued working papers entitled “Implementation of 
changes to the Paris and Brussels Conventions on nuclear third party liability” in 




for  implementing  the  new  categories  of  damage  into  the  1965  Act.  As  far  as 











the  two  international  Conventions  (Paris  and  Vienna)  governing  liability  for  civil  nuclear 
accidents  to extend  reciprocal benefits  to each other. The  ratification of  the  Joint Protocol will 
enable UK participation  for  the  first  time  in a global compensation regime between  the  largely 
Western  European  parties  to  the  Paris  Convention  and  the  parties  to  the  Vienna  Convention, 




possible,  DECC  intend  to  use  the  wording  and  definitions  in  the  2004  Paris 
Protocol.  In  general,  the  new  categories  of  damage  will  be  implemented  by 
amending  the  duties  under  sections  7,  8,  9  and  10  of  the  Act  together  with 
section 12. The  first  category of economic  loss arising  from property damage or 
personal injury is intended to provide a right to compensation for economic loss 
that  result  from property damage or personal  injury69 and not  “pure economic 
loss”. This is already covered by the Act. Accordingly, no amendments to the Act 
are required. However, the statutory duty does not appear to allow claimants to 




damage  or  personal  injury.  This  working  paper  sets  out  that  the  Government 
intend to modify the section 7 duty so that certain occurrences of nuclear matter 
or  emissions  of  radiation  do  not  cause  significant  impairment  to  the 





will  be  providing  guidance  to  highlight  relevant  factors  that  the  court  should 
consider  when  evaluating  whether  there  has  been  a  “significant  impairment”. 
This  category  will  also  have  implications  for  many  other  associated  laws  and 
some  standardising  between  the  different  arrangements  (e.g.  consistent 
definition of “environment”) is likely to be required. There is likely to be further 
review surrounding the meaning of “measures of reinstatement”.70 The working 
paper  sets  out  that  a  requirement  for  reasonableness  (e.g.  appropriate  and 
proportionate  in  the circumstances) will be  included  in the amendments. DECC 
may provide supporting non‐statutory guidance on this aspect. 
 
  Another  category  that  has  received  a  lot  of  attention  is  loss  of  income 
deriving  from  a  direct71  economic  interest  of  the  environment.  This  category  of 
economic loss is not connected to any property damage or personal injury and is 
                                                 
69 The DECC paper also questioned whether the Operator or the Government should meet claims 
for certain categories of damage before others. This does raise a number of questions in relation 
to how claims are prioritised and which claims should be paid  first. What  if  the damage/injury 
does not manifest itself for many years, does this put a hold on all other compensation payments? 
Would this result  in victims not being compensated for certain  losses because they fall  into the 
wrong category? Does it mean there will be lot of sub‐limits under the overall limit on liability? ‐ 
NIA, 2010 (supra note 55): outlined that DECC decided against the idea of ranking claims. 
70 NIA,  2010.  Supra note 55.  Further, Working Paper 1  also provides  that DECC  consider  such 
measures could potentially cover clean‐up costs (such as the costs of removing and disposing of 
contaminated material),  the  cost  of  implementing  shielding  options  (such  as  dilution  or  using 
shielding material)  as well  as  restorative or  replacement actions  (such as  replacing  top‐soil  or 
organisms).    DECC  continue  to  outline  that  they  consider  reinstatement measures  as  covering 
assessment  or monitoring  of  the  environment  in  circumstances where  it  is  sufficiently  closely 
connected to possible reinstatement action.  




sometimes  labelled  “pure  economic  loss”.72  The  example  cited  is where  fish  in 
the sea are contaminated by radiation and the fisherman is no longer able to sell 
his catch.73 The fisherman could not normally recover the loss because he did not 
own  the  fish  or  the  sea.  The word  “direct”  only  results  in  compensation  being 




the  loss  is  too  remote  in  the  chain  of  causation  (i.e.  the  retailer  would  have 
difficulty  proving  that  it  has  a  “direct  economic  interest”  in  the  environment). 
The  duty  is  likely  to  be  extended  so  certain  occurrences  of  nuclear matter  or 
emissions of radiation do not cause significant  impairment to  the environment. 
Although this category of damage presents difficulties for insurers, it is narrowly 
drawn. It  is only the loss of  income; from a “direct” economic  interest resulting 
from  a  significant  impairment75  of  the  environment  that  is  subject  to 
compensation.  There  is  no  compensation  if  someone  merely  has  rights  of 
enjoyment of the environment.76 The last new category is the costs of preventive 
measures  in the event of a nuclear  incident, or a serious threat of one.77 This  is 
intended to allow the costs of  these preventive measures to be  recovered from 
the Operator. However, whether public authorities such as  the police, NHS and 
fire brigade would  claim compensation,  is debatable. There  is  likely  to be  (i)  a 
new duty on Operators to secure that no event will arise which  creates a grave 
and imminent threat of a breach of the Operators’ other statutory duties; and (ii) 
an entitlement  to compensation where  the Operator has breached  its  statutory 
duty and claimants have incurred costs from reasonable preventive measures.78 
DECC also recognise the possibility that this category would cover further loss or 
damage  caused  by  such  preventive  measures,  which  could  be  suffered  by 
someone different from the person taking the preventive measures. For example, 
where a public  authority evacuates  someone and  that person  incurs additional 
accommodation  costs.  The  person  would  then  be  entitled  to  make  a  claim 
directly against the Operator.  
                                                 
72 Emmerechts (2010: 148): Emmerechts, S. 2010. Environmental Protection under Nuclear Law: 
Still  a  Long  Way  to  Go.  International  Nuclear  Law:  History,  Evolution  and  Outlook,  10th 
Anniversary of the ISNL. NEA: OECD, Paris, France. 
73 There are numerous other examples such as: lost income for the outdoor activity instructors in 








as  the  polices,  NHS,  government  departments,  fire  brigade  etc.)  including:  securing  the  area 
affected,  monitoring  radiation,  evacuating  the  local  population  and  providing  alternative 









The second working paper entitled, availability of  insurance  to cover  the 
new types of damage sets out the arrangements for  insurance or other financial 
security  that  will  need  to  be maintained  for  increased  liability  and  preferably 
longer  durations  and  a  wider  range  of  damages  in  an  increased  number  of 
countries. This working paper  indicates that NRIL79 could provide  insurance to 
cover  the majority of  the new categories of damage. However, at present  there 




















































































see  the  articles  by  Tetley  and  Reitsma  (2010:  402):  Tetley,  M.,  and  Reitsma,  S.  M.  S..  2010. 















the Government will  need  to  consider  other  financial  security  bearing  in mind 
that  the Government will need  to approve any alternative arrangements under 
section 19(1) of the Act. It is understood that the Government will be the insurer 








the  only  defences  provided  by  the  Act  that  would  result  in  no  compensation 
being payable by the Operator in the event that a nuclear incident is caused by 
hostile action. It is similar to Article 9 in the Paris Convention which refers to the 
Operator  as  not  being  liable  for  nuclear  damage  due  to  “armed  conflict, 
hostilities, civil war or insurrection”. Despite a request by the insurance industry, 
this  defence  has  been  interpreted  as  not  granting  a  defence  for  acts  of 
terrorism91 and responsibility for terrorist events is with the Operator.92 Section 





or  damage  by  an  act  committed  with  intent  to  cause  harm  or  with  reckless 
disregard for the consequences of such act. It is essentially a form of contributory 
negligence  and  does  not  exclude  or  transfer  the Operator’s  liability  to  another 
party.  Interestingly,  this  section  is  more  akin  to  the  drafting  in  the  Vienna 
Convention  than  the  Paris  Convention.  The  Act  is  still  different  from  the 
equivalent provision in the Vienna Convention in that (a) the Act only refers to 
an “act” done with intent whereas both the Paris and Vienna Conventions refer to 
an  “act or omission” done with  intent; and (b)  the Vienna Convention refers  to 
“gross negligence” whereas the Act refers to “reckless disregard”. One of the key 
benefits for Operators is that the Operator’s liability is limited in time and amount. 




92  The  position  is  slightly  different  in  Australia,  Lithuania,  Romania  and  Ukraine  where  the 
liability  resulting  from  a  terrorist  act  would  either  be  covered  by  Government  (Romania)  or 









they are brought after  ten years (against  the Operator) or  thirty years (against 
the  Government).  Similarly,  the  Operator  is  only  liable  to  settle  claims  up  to 
£140m million.  Section  16(3)  sets  out  that  any  claims  exceeding  £140 million 
will be made against the Government. Public funds would meet claims between 
£140 million and £300 million (approx SDR300 million) but beyond this,  losses 







The  Paris  Convention  sets  out  that  the  Operator  shall  be  liable  for  nuclear 
damage  other  than  (i)  damage  to  the  nuclear  installation  itself  including  any 
installation  under  construction,  and  (ii)  damage  to  the  property  on  the 
installation  site  which  is  being  used  in  connection  with  the  installation. 
Accordingly,  the  duty  under  section  7  and  the  liability  to  pay  compensation 
under  section 12  of  the Act  does not  apply  to  the Operator’s  property  (i.e.  the 
installation  itself  and  other  property  on  the  site  used  in  connection  with  the 
installation).  The  concern  from  the  Supplier’s  perspective  is  that,  pursuant  to 





















material)  is  being  used  for  constructing,  operating  or  decommissioning  an 
installation. In the event that a Supplier’s property is damaged whilst on the site, 
the  Operator  will  not  be  under  any  obligation  to  compensate  the  Supplier. 
Interestingly,  section 7(3)  is  in  respect  of  “any  occurrences”  and  therefore  the 
Supplier’s property would not be deemed to be the property of the Operator,  if 
                                                 









The  original  1965 Act  allowed  the Operator  or  its  insurer  (through  the 
process  of  subrogation)97  to  bring  an  action  against  a  Supplier  if  property  is 
damaged as a result of the Supplier’s breach of contract or negligence caused by 





the operation or  the  construction of  the  installation,  is  excluded by  the  [Paris] 
Convention  from  the  liability  of  the  operator”.  However,  the  original  1965 Act 
allowed  “the  owner  of  such  property  to  claim  against  the  operator,  or  the 
Supplier of a component, if negligence could be established.”99 This could result 
in third parties incurring liability. The 1969 Act partly addressed this problem by 
amending  the  Act  in  the  form  of  a  new  section  12(3A), which  introduced  two 







(a) in pursuance of an agreement  to  incur  liability  in respect of  such damage 
entered into in writing before the occurrence of the damage…. ; or 





liability.  The  first  exception  is  in  section 12(3A)(a).  This  section provides  that, 
where damage is caused to the property of the Operator, a Supplier or any third 
party may  incur  liability  for  such  damage  if  the  Supplier  enters  into  a written 
agreement  to  incur  liability  in  respect of  such damage before  the occurrence of 
the  damage.  The  concern  for  the  Supplier  is  that  many  industry  standard 
conditions  of  contract  and  many  Operators’  standard  conditions  of  contract 
(“standard  conditions”)  do  not  distinguish  between  nuclear  liability  and  other 
types  of  more  conventional  liability.  The  standard  conditions  often  include 
provisions that make the Supplier liable to the Operator for loss, damage and/or 














injury arising  from  the Supplier’s breach of  contract  together with  indemnities 
for  such  loss,  damage  and  injury  including  third  party  claims.  These  types  of 
clauses can be found in a number of industry standard conditions (such as FIDIC, 
GC Works;  IChemE or NEC3).  If  they are not  in  these standard conditions,  they 
are  often  contained  in  the  Operator’s  special  conditions.    These  liability  and 
indemnity  clauses  in  relation  to  damage,  although  not  specifically  referring  to 
nuclear damage, could be sufficient to make a Supplier liable for nuclear damage 
to property, amongst other forms of more conventional damage. There does not 
appear  to  be  any  need  for  nuclear  damage  to  be  specifically mentioned  in  the 
relevant  contract  in order  for  section 12(3A)(a)  to  result  in  the Supplier being 
liable.  The  term  “damage”  is  general  enough  to  cover  nuclear  as  well  as 
conventional  damage.  It  is  therefore  important  for  a  Supplier  to  amend  the 
conditions of contract so the Supplier is not liable for damage to the Operator’s 
property.  This  is  usually  achieved  by:  (a)  an  indemnity  for  nuclear  damage; 
and/or  (b)  an  express  provision  that  nothing  either  express  or  implied  in  the 
conditions  of  the  Contract  is  or  is  deemed  to  be  a  written  agreement  for  the 
Supplier to  incur  liability within section 12(3A) of the Nuclear Installations Act 
1965 as amended. The second category is intended to negate the possibility that 
the  Supplier  has  entered  into  such  an  agreement  by  accepting  standard 
conditions  in  which  he  accepts  liability  for  damage  when  those  conditions  of 
contract  draw  no  distinction  between  uninsured  nuclear  and  conventional 
damage.  It  is  also  advisable  to  extend  this  provision  to  state  that  the Operator 






cause  injury  or  damage.  This  conjures  up  the  bizarre  situation  of  a  Supplier 
deliberately  causing  damage. Although  there  is  a  temptation  to  dismiss  this  as 
unworthy of concern, the fact remains that there is a possibility for a Supplier to 
be  responsible  for  an  employee’s  act  or  omission  and  the  more  senior  the 
employee,  the more  likely  this  responsibility.  Suppliers have agonised whether 
this  exception  could  expose  them  to  liability.  There  appear  to  be  two  possible 
scenarios.  The  first  could  be  the  Supplier  being  vicariously  liable  for  nuclear 
damage  resulting  from  intentional  or  deliberate  acts  or  omissions  by  its 
employees  in  the  course  of  their  employment.  There  are  a  number  of  legal 





was  acting  on  the  instructions  of  his  or  her  employer).  Without  wanting  to 
rehearse all  the arguments,  the most appropriate view  is  that  this section does 
not expose the Supplier to vicarious liability. The second possibility is where the 







Supplier  is  liable  as  principal.  This  would  result  from  the  deliberate  act  being 
carried out by an employee at a level of authority to speak and act as the Supplier 
itself  (normally  director  level  or  a  senior  employee).  This  would  be  a  rather 
bizarre  situation  where  a  director  or  senior  employee  deliberately  caused 
nuclear  damage.  This  does  not  seem  to  be  a  risk  requiring  indemnification. 
However,  if  the  Operator  were  willing  to  indemnify  the  Supplier  for  damage 




















the duties under section 7  to 12,  liability  to compensate under section 12 does 
not apply. Liability would  then be determined on common  law principles.106  In 
practice, it appears that almost every conceivable situation is covered by the Act 
but, for completeness, the point should be borne in mind.107 There are four main 


















109  The  authority  for  a  duty  of  care  is  the  case  of Donoghue  v  Stevenson  [1932]  AC  562  (HL), 







defendant’s  liability will  only  arise  if  his  action  breaches  the  duty  of  care  and 
caused a reasonably foreseeable loss or harm.112 The standard of care applied to 
professionals  with  a  particular  skill  or  expertise,  such  a  Supplier  of  specialist 
nuclear  services,  is  that  of  the  reasonable  person  with  the  same  skill  or 
expertise;113 (3) did the breach cause damage or  loss to the claimant’s person or 
property? There must be a casual link between the defendant’s acts or omissions 
and  the  claimant’s  loss  or  damage.  The  starting  point  is  to  identify  a  chain  of 
causation.114  This  is  sometimes  complicated  if  there  are  multiple  causes  (e.g. 
several  Supplier  working  on  the  same  project)  or  difficulty  identifying  which 
party caused the damage (e.g. integrated Supplier/Operator teams); and (4) was 
the damage or loss suffered by the claimant too remote? Finally, the claimant must 
establish  that  the  damage  suffered  is  a  direct  result  of  the  defendant’s  acts  or 
omissions.115  If  the  claimant  can  prove  that  the  damage  suffered  is  directly 
attributable  to  the defendant’s  acts or omissions,  the defendant  is  liable  for all 
resulting damage. 
 
The  second  most  likely  tort  is  that  of  nuisance.  This  may  be  ‘private’ 
(affecting  individuals) or  ‘public’  (affecting a wider class of  the general public). 
Private nuisance relates to the unreasonable interference with someone’s rights 
to use or enjoy land or some right over or enjoyment of land.116 Private nuisance 
is  not  actionable  per  se;  the  claimant must  suffer  loss,  damage  or  injury  for  a 
claim to be successful.  If  following the Chernobyl accident, Welsh farmers were 
prevented  from  selling  dairy  products  after  radioactive  contamination  of  their 
land, this is likely to form a private nuisance action. Public nuisance117 affects a 
                                                 
110 Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2AC 605 (HL).  A duty of care can also be owed to an 




















117  Section  79  of  the  Environmental  Protection  Act  1990  of  the  Environmental  Protection  Act 
1990 (“EPA”) reflects the public nuisance principles and creates a statutory nuisance. In relation 
to contaminated land, it is likely that any decontamination costs relating to damage to property 
will  fall within  the 1965 Act. However,  radioactive contamination  is  catered  for  in  the EPA (as 
EPRG No    1205                                                                                                                
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class  of  people.118  The  claimant  is  entitled  to  damages  if  special  damage  is 
suffered  that  surpasses  the  general  inconvenience  suffered  by  the  rest  of  the 
public  or  class.119  Another  potential  tort  is  the  rule  in  Rylands  v.  Fletcher 











armoury,  were  he  or  she  to  sue  for  loss  or  damage  caused  by  a  nuclear 
incident”.122  The  final  likely  tort  is  trespass  to  land  and  person  where  the 
claimant, who has suffered unjustified and direct interference on his land, would 
be  able  to  take  an  action  against  a  person who  has  caused  the  interference123 
(e.g. the Operator or Supplier who has caused a nuclear incident). Trespass could 













then be held  liable  in  that  country’s  courts. The other example  is  the negligent 
                                                                                                                                            
amended by the Radioactive Contaminated Land (Modification of Enactments) Regulations 2007) 
which  sets  out  that  the  Secretary  of  country  is  responsible  for  the  cost  of  decontaminating  or 
cleaning up the site following a nuclear incident in the event that the Operator is not liable.  


















results  in  nuclear  damage  in  Ireland.  Ireland  is  a  non‐convention  country.  The 
Supplier could be sued in Ireland by the victim in tort. The 1965 Act would not 
be  applicable  and would offer no protection. The  interests  of  Irish  citizens  are 
sometimes  viewed  as  being  “better  protected  by  relying  upon  the  substantive 
law  of  the  state  and  the  system  of  recognition  and  enforcement  of 
judgements.”125  These  examples  outline  the  potential  trans‐boundary 
implications  that  could  expose  the  Supplier  to  liability.  On  the  basis  that  the 




be  enforced  in  the  UK,  is  a  Paris  Convention  country  or  a  non‐convention 
country.126    
 
In  the  event  there  is  a  judgement  in  another  convention  country  (i.e. 
signatory  to  the Paris/Brussels  convention),  section 17(4) of  the 1965 Act  sets 
out that such judgements can be registered for enforcement in the UK under the 




the  other  contracting  states  to  the Paris  Convention.  It  is  usually  the Operator 
who would be  liable under  this Article but  the Exposé des Motifs  sets out  that 
judgements are also enforceable under Article 13(d)  for actions concerning the 
Operator’s  right  of  recourse.127 Nevertheless,  one of  the principles  of  the Paris 
Convention is that jurisdiction over actions lies exclusively with the courts of the 
convention  country  where  the  nuclear  incident  occurred.128  It  is  therefore 
unlikely that a judgement in another Paris Convention country would need to be 
enforced  in  the  UK,  particularly  as  the  Operator  is  likely  to  be  based  in  that 

































on  section 17(5) which  applies  to  awards  “in  respect  of  injury  or damage  of  a 
description  which  is  the  subject  of”130  the  Paris  Convention  and  where  the 
original  judgement was made in a non‐convention country. Importantly,  from a 
Supplier’s  perspective,  is  that  any  third  party may  be  liable  under  the  laws  of 
non‐convention  country  if  the  claimant  can  show  that  the  Supplier  caused  or 
contributed to a nuclear incident through its negligence. This  is clearly contrary 
to  the  principle  of  channelization  and  section  17(5)  is  intended  to  bar 
enforcement of judgements in such cases.131 
 
The  defence  in  section  17(5)  is  however  subject  to  section  17(5)A132 
which sets out that the defence cannot be used where the judgement in question 
is  enforceable  in  the UK  in pursuance of  an  international  agreement. The  term 
“international  agreement”  is  not  restricted  to  international  conventions  in  the 
field  of  nuclear  energy.  As  a  result,  there  will  not  be  much  difficulty  for  a 
judgement  to  be  enforced  in  the  UK  when  the  non‐convention  country  is  a 
contracting  party  to  any  of  the  conventions  for  the  enforcement  of  foreign 
judgements. A foreign judgement may be enforced in the UK if the country falls 
under  (a)    the  European  Enforcement  Order  Regulation;133  (b)  the  Brussels 
Regulation;134  (c)  the  1988  or  2007  Lugano  Convention;135  (d)  judgements  of 
commonwealth states;136 and/or (e) countries with which the UK has a bilateral 
treaty137  (the  “Enforcement  Treaties”).  Accordingly,  in  the  event  that  nuclear 
                                                 
130 Section 17(5) of the Nuclear Installations (Amendment) Act 1965. 
131 Hansard: col. 1279 – HL DEB 04 March 1965 Vol. 263 c. 1279  




and  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of  judgements  in  civil  and  commercial  matters).  The 
Brussels Regulation applies to all EU member states. 
135 The full title is the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments  in  Civil  and  Commercial Matters.  Both  Lugano  Conventions  are  very  similar  to  the 
Brussels Convention. The Lugano Conventions governs the enforcement of judgements between 












the  auspices  of  one  of  the  Enforcement  Treaties,  a  claimant  would  be  able  to 
bring an action in that country;138  the courts of  that country are  likely to apply 
their own laws; and in the event that the claimant succeeds, the UK courts would 
have  to  recognise  and  enforce  the  judgement.  These  non‐convention  countries 
that  are  parties  to  some  of  the  Enforcement  Treaties  include  Ireland, 
Luxembourg  and  Austria.  Tromans  uses  the  example  of  the  civil  proceedings 
brought  in  Ireland  in  the  1990s  for  personal  injury,  psychiatric  illness  and 
mental stress. If the claims139 were successful, they would have been enforced in 
the UK against BNFL as a result of the UK and Ireland both being parties to the 








for  Suppliers.  It  would  be  unwise  for  a  Supplier  to  rely  solely  on  the  Act,  the 
international  conventions,  or  a  foreign  country’s  national  law.  A  robust 
indemnity  is  often  the  only  mechanism  to  comfort  the  Supplier.141  Indemnity 
clauses do not absolve the Supplier from liability. The Supplier would be liable to 
the  third  party  but  entitled  to  recover  compensation  from  the  indemnifying 
party.  For  example,  the  Supplier  may  be  commissioned  to  prepare  a  working 
method  for  repairing  pipe‐work  which  contains  contaminated  water.  The 
Supplier  may  negligently  omit  to  state  the  precautions  which  must  be  taken 
before  the  pipe‐work  is  cut  open  and  as  a  result  contaminated water  escapes 
contaminating part of the installation, the Supplier’s property and neighbouring 
land. A properly drafted indemnity would mean that the Operator has to hold the 





view  surrounding  a  hypothetical  case  in  relation  to  claims  in  Ireland  and  the  use  of  the  1968 
Brussels Convention, see Sands and Galizzi (2009: 19): Sands, P. and Galizzi, P. 2009. The 1968 
Brussels Convention and Liability for Nuclear Damage. Nuclear Law Bulletin, 64. 
139  If  a  tort  is  committed  in  a  non‐convention  country,  MAYSS  states  that  under  the  Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, it “will be governed by the lex loci delicti, 
i.e.  the  law of  the country where  the  tort was committed.”  It must therefore be shown that the 






association  with  Blackstone  Press  Limited,  [Online:  Accessed  between  December  01  2010  – 
February 28th 2011:   available at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1996/issue2/mayss2.html]. 
140 Tromans (2010: 216): Supra note 85.   









however  protect  the  Supplier  from  reputational  issues  which  (irrespective  of 
whether  any  action  against  the  Supplier  was  successful  or  not)  in  themselves 
could be  financially ruinous  for  the Supplier.143  It  is  important  to note that any 
indemnity  for  nuclear  damage  will  not  achieve  legal  channelization  since  it  is 
essentially  a  form  of  economic  channelling  of  liability  to  the  Operator.  
Nevertheless,  they  are  an  important  contractual mechanism  for  Suppliers who 





providing  nuclear  indemnities.144  The  indemnities  offered  by  Operators  also 
vary: some, for example, do not apply if the Supplier has been negligent; others 
have exceptions for a corporate act or omission done with intent whereas others 
provide  for  full  coverage  of  the  Supplier  and  its  affiliates  including  all 
participants in the supply chain. The argument that the indemnity does not apply 
in the event the Supplier is negligent is self‐defeating from the Supplier’s point‐
of‐view. These  indemnities are  illogical because  the Operator  is  insured  for  the 
risk; they expose the Supplier to claims for which he is uninsured; and in the vast 
majority of  situations  liability will be channelled exclusively  to  the Operator  in 
any event.  It  follows  that,  in order  to  realise  the  full  intent of  the  international 
conventions, Operators should  indemnify Suppliers against all  forms of nuclear 
liability  and  the  only  exceptions  being  agreed  rights  of  recourse  or  nuclear 




be  used  in  the  nuclear  island  or  instructing/directing  the  contractor  is  vastly 
different  to  the  Supplier  providing  early  feasibility  studies.  However,  the 
exposure to liability does not depend on the size of the contract since even low 
                                                 
142 OECD NEA Secretariat (2008: 41): Supra note 81. 
143 OECD NEA Secretariat (2008: 38): Supra note 81. 
144  As  an  aside,  Suppliers  are  sometimes  asked  to  provide  nuclear  services  to  companies, 
organisations  or  Government  Departments  where  there  is  no  Operator  involvement  (e.g.  the 
clean‐up of contamination in the aftermath of a terrorist event). In this situation, there may not 
be any protection under  the 1965 Act or any of  the  international conventions on nuclear  third 
party liability and it is clear a nuclear indemnity would be beneficial. There would be a number of 
issues  to consider such as,  the nature of  the work, substances being cleaned‐up, where did  the 
substance originate, does it fall into the definition of nuclear material, the client etc. 
145 Bowden (2010) expressed the view that that where an Operator, located in a non‐convention 








value  contracts  with  limited  services  or  small  quantities  of  equipment  could 
cause or contribute to a nuclear incident with devastating consequences.146 
 
The value of the  indemnity to the Supplier  is dependent on the  financial 
strength of the indemnifying party. The indemnity would clearly be worthless if 
the Operator did not have the  funds to compensate the Supplier.  It  is  therefore 
important  to  obtain  an  indemnity  from  a  body  of  substance.  Accordingly, 
Suppliers often require an indemnity from the Government which  improves the 
likelihood  of  the  indemnifier  having  the  financial  wherewithal  to  meet  any 




is  run  by  the  state)  can  rely  on  the  defence  of  sovereign  immunity 
against liability. Although contracting countries to the Paris and Vienna 
Conventions  cannot  rely on  the defence of  sovereign  immunity,  some 
non‐convention  countries  may  be  entitled  to  rely  on  this  defence. 
Sovereign immunity should therefore be investigated at the negotiation 
stage. If it is likely to be a concern in a particular territory, the Supplier 
should  evaluate  its  options  including  the  effectiveness  of  an  express 

















                                                 
146 OECD NEA Secretariat (2008: 38): Supra note 81. 
147 For example, the EBRD funded decommissioning activities at Chernobyl, where the Cabinet of 
Ministers  of  Ukraine  issued  Resolution  223  on  Indemnifying  Participants  in  the  Shelter 











• Another  consideration  is  whether  the  concept  of  indemnity  is 
recognised  under  the  particular  governing  law.  For  instance,  the 
concept  of  indemnity  is  not well  recognised  in Russia  or Kazakhstan. 
There  is  a  risk  that  it would  confer  no  greater  rights  than  a  claim  in 
damages  or  be  unenforceable  under  the  civil  codes  for  these 
jurisdictions.149 The risk for the Supplier is that the indemnity may be 
displaced in favour of the country’s law. It is always advisable to obtain 
independent  local  legal  advice  regarding  how  the  "indemnity" would 
be treated under a particular governing law.150  
 
• Finally,  the  indemnified  party  should  always  consider  whether  the 
Government  providing  the  indemnity  has  the  legal  capacity  or 
authority  to  provide  the  indemnity  or  to  agree  certain  arbitration 
provisions and whether such positions need the approval from another 
Government department. The Government of a particular country may 
not  have  the  legal  capacity  to  provide  the  indemnity.  It  may,  for 
example,  be  another  department  or  federation  that  should  execute 
agreements.  
 
The  issue  with  nuclear  indemnities  was  witnessed  with  two  recent 
decommissioning  contracts  issued  by  the  UK’s  Nuclear  Decommissioning 
Authority  (“NDA”).151  Department  for  Business  Enterprise  and  Regulatory 
Reform  (“BERR”)  issued  written  ministerial  statements  regarding  indemnities 
that  the NDA152  provided  in  the  contracts  relating  to  (a)  the  Low  Level Waste 
Repository  at  Drigg153  and  (b)  the  Sellafield  Parent  Body  Organisation.154  The 
statements outlined how the NDA proposed to indemnify the contractors and its 
                                                 
149 Knyazhev, A. and Zakharko, A. 2007. The Use of Warranties in M&A Transactions. Salans LLP: 












that  the  historic  liability  issues with  the  decommissioning market  could  be  removed  from  the 














affiliates  for  uninsurable  claims  that  fall  outside  the  current  nuclear  liability 
regime. The statements outlined that given the low probability of any claims, the 
NDA  had  “assessed  that  the  benefits  of  engaging  the  contractor  outweigh  the 
small risk that the indemnity may be called.”155 BERR’s rationale for backing the 
NDA  indemnity  was  partly  because  some  of  the  shareholder  companies  were 
based in the USA whereas Drigg and Sellafield are in the UK.156 The US is not a 
party  to  any  convention  that  is  in  force.  The  departmental  minute  for  Drigg 
stated that there is a “residual risk that the courts of a country who is not party 
to the Conventions may accept jurisdictions to determine liability in the event of 















international  conventions  are  implemented,  the  subject  of  third  party  nuclear 
liability  is  likely  to attract more attention  from many of  the  participants  in  the 
nuclear industry and not least the Supplier. However, the law in this area is not 
without  its  problems  and  there  have  been  several  criticisms  and 
recommendations for improvement.  
 
                                                 
155 Ibid. 
156  The  Sellafield  PBO  is  the  company  Nuclear  Management  Partners  Limited  which  is  a  JV 
company with shareholders being URS – Washington Division (USA), AMEC (UK) and AREVA NC 
(France):  see  [Online:  Accessed  between  December  01  2010  –  February  28th  2011:  from 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/contracts/competition/sellafield.cfm].  The  Drigg  PBO  is  UK  Nuclear 
Waste  Management  Limited  which  is  also  a  JV  company  with  shareholders  being  URS  ‐ 
Washington  Division  and  others  including  Studsvik,  Areva  and  Serco  Assurance:  see  [Online: 









159 Many  countries  have  nuclear  new build  ambitions with  others  having  existing  installations 




The  most  important  feature  of  the  international  conventions  for  the 
nuclear  supply  chain  is  the  principle  of  channelization.160  One  of  the  main 
reasons  for  the  introduction  of  channelization  was  to  protect  Suppliers. 
However,  channelization  has  been  criticised  and  several  legal  arguments  in 
support  of  reforming  the  principle  have  been  made.161  From  an  industry 
perspective this could have a huge impact. It is likely that some Suppliers would 
not be willing to accept this exposure to nuclear liability and would simply cease 
to  work  in  the  nuclear  industry:  they  may  decide  to  revise  their  corporate 
strategies  and  re‐focus  on  non‐nuclear  industries.  This  would  have  a 
considerable impact on an industry that is undergoing a renaissance, particularly 
as  there  are  already  signs  of  resource  shortages  and  fewer  but  more  global 
Suppliers.  As  was  shown  earlier,  the  experience  in  the  UK’s  decommissioning 
market  indicates  that  many  global  Suppliers’  are  not  willing  to  take  on 
potentially  ruinous  and  uninsured  exposure  and  if  that  situation were  present 
they would focus on other industries instead.   
 
Apart  from  the Operator’s  relatively  low  levels  of  financial  security  and 




more certainty  for Suppliers. The amendments will  result  in claims  for a wider 
range  of  nuclear  damage  being  channelled  to  the  Operator  thus  reducing  the 
Supplier’s exposure to tortious claims.  
 
The  ambiguity  in  respect  of  damage  caused  to  the  nuclear  installation 
itself and property on the site of the installation is of concern. This is important 
from  a  Supplier’s  perspective  and  is  likely  to  gain  more  attention  as  the  new 
build  programs  in many  countries  advance.  The  ambiguity would  be  removed, 
and more  certainty  created,  if  the  conventions were  clarified  to  state  that  the 
Operator is exclusively liable for all damage to property including the installation 
itself,  which  would  be  in  addition  to  the  other  liability  channelled  to  the 
Operator.162  
 
Another  key  concern  for  the  Supplier  is  in  relation  to  the  patchwork  of 
international  conventions  and  the  trans­boundary  consequences  which  may 
result  from  a  nuclear  incident.  This  creates  a  number  of  uncertainties,  for 
example, when identifying which courts have jurisdiction over a claim and which 
convention/  national  laws  apply.  The  Supplier who  causes  or  contributes  to  a 
nuclear incident could be exposed to actions from victims in countries where the 
damage  occurs  or  where  the  installation  is  located  or  where  the  Supplier  is 
                                                 
160 This is reflected in most national laws apart from the US and Austria. 
161  For  instance,  see  Ameye,  E.  2009.  Channelling  of  nuclear  third  party  liability  towards  the 
Operator: is it sustainable in a developing nuclear world or is there a need for liability of nuclear 






located. The Chernobyl  accident163  raised awareness of  the problem but a  true 
global  liability  regime with widespread  adherence  has  yet  to materialise.164  In 
fact,  the countries with the  largest nuclear capacity have not  ratified any of the 
international conventions currently in force. 165 This patchwork of international 
convention is something that has been recognised as an impediment to nuclear 




any  real  incentive  for  non‐nuclear  countries  to  ratify  any  of  the  nuclear 
conventions and it “is surely no coincidence that it is principally nuclear power 
states which  have  acceded  to”  them.  169  Citizens  in  non‐nuclear  countries  also 
appear to be in a better position under the Enforcement Treaties. It is therefore 
unlikely  that  all  countries  with  nuclear  power  and  neighbouring  non‐nuclear 
countries will ratify the same convention or a bridging convention. The position 
would  however  be  improved  for  UK  Suppliers  working  in  many  Vienna 
Convention countries if the UK ratified the Joint Protocol.  
 
                                                 







See Van Dyke  (2008:  30):  Dyke,  J. M.  2008.    Liability  And Compensation For Harm Caused By 
Nuclear Activities. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 35 (16), 13‐46. 
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international  conventions  in  the  oil  and  gas  industry.  Although,  the  impact  of  this  case  on  the 
nuclear liability conventions would require more detailed review, if the decision was applied to 
the nuclear  liability conventions,  it would seriously undermine  the  international  regime. There 
are  similarities with  the Paris  and Vienna Conventions. The  International Conventions on Civil 












Often  the only  real  protection available  to  the  Supplier  from potentially 
ruinous liability is indemnification for nuclear damage. The indemnity should be 
provided  by  a  body  of  substance  which  is  usually  the  Operator  and/or  the 
Government  of  the  installation  state.  It  is  important  for  the  indemnity  to  be 
clearly  drafted  to  cover  any  loss  incurred  in  connection  with  (1)  the  nuclear 
installation itself, (2) on‐site property (including the Supplier’s property) and (3) 
third  party  claims.  The  Supplier  should  however  bear  in  mind  that  any 
reputational damage would not be covered by such an indemnity.  
 
The  law  surrounding  third  party  nuclear  liability  is  important  to  all 
parties in the nuclear supply chain, whether they are providing decommissioning 
services,  project  management  expertise  or  a  new  reactor.  Irrespective  of  the 
services,  equipment or  technology being provided,  it  is  likely  that all  Suppliers 




















































Table A.1: The Seven Principles of the Paris Convention 
 Principle Explanation 
1 Strict 
Liability 
The operator of a nuclear installation (“Operator”) is strictly liable. Victims do not need to prove that the 
Operator is negligent or at fault. It “is only necessary to demonstrate that the nuclear damage is caused by the 
nuclear incident”. The victim only needs to prove a “causal link between the damage and the nuclear accident.”  
Although the Paris Convention does not refer to the term strict liability, it states that the Operator is liable upon 





From the Supplier’s perspective, this is probably the most important principle. The Operator is exclusively 
liable for damage resulting from a nuclear incident. The Operator, with limited exceptions, is liable to the 
exclusion of any other person and regardless of who caused the damage. The victims of a nuclear incident 
would only pursue the Operator and not the Suppliers. The channelling liability appears, on the face of it, 
unfair, because the Operator could be liable even if a third party was negligent or at fault. It has however 
become a cornerstone of the liability regime. It provides certainty to the Operator and victims of a nuclear 
incident; compensation settlements should be quick; it avoids the wrong person being sued which can be costly 
and time-consuming; it avoids double insurance. The certainty provided by the channelization (together with 




This limitation is particularly important because injury “may not manifest for some time after the exposure to 
radiation has actually occurred.” The limitation period is intended to help both the claimant (where the 
consequences will not be understood for several years) and the defendant and insurers (where liability exposure 




The Operator’s liability is limited in amount. The Operator is therefore sheltered from the full potential 
consequences of a nuclear incident. This limit on the Operator’s liability is viewed as the “quid pro quo for 
strict and exclusive liability.” Public funds will provide supplementary compensation to meet victims’ claims 





Operators are obligated to carry financial security to cover their potential “liability to third parties in an amount 
corresponding to their imposed liability amount.” Financial security is usually provided by insurance from 
special nuclear pools. There are however other methods such as the Operator self insuring, government 
guarantees/indemnities, bank guarantees, letters of credit, mutual fund, Operators’ pooling. 
6 Jurisdiction  Jurisdiction over actions lies exclusively with the courts of the contracting country where the nuclear incident 
occurred. The courts of other contracting countries will not be competent to hear the claims. Judgements made 
by the competent court will be recognised and enforced in other contracting countries. This principle is only 
effective when many countries have ratified either the same convention or a bridging convention. Victims may, 
on first impressions, see it as an advantage to be entitled to sue all possible parties in different courts for 
nuclear damage. This is however in the victim’s interest in that compensation is distributed in a fair/equitable 
manner. If the victim were free to sue any party in any court it would create a situation where victims who are 
first to sue would have their losses compensated but victims who sued later, would “receive loss or nothing”. 
7 Applicable 
Law 
The applicable law is the national law of the competent court that has jurisdiction. The national law must also 
be applied without discrimination on grounds of nationality, domicile and residence. The applicable law 
principle helps prevent costly and lengthy arguments about which law applies with parties discussing the 













1: Joint Protocol170 
 
The Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention, although sharing the same basic principles, are 
clearly distinct. The absence of any relationship between the two conventions could result in the 
situation where a nuclear incident in country A (that is a contracting party to the Paris Convention) 
results in damage being suffered by victims in country B (that is a contracting party to the Vienna 
Convention). The Operator in country A would then be exposed to claims from the victims in country 
B and liability would not be determined in accordance with the Paris Convention principles. This issue 
was highlighted by the Chernobyl accident which raised global awareness about the “potential for 
trans-boundary damage in the case of serious nuclear accidents.”171 The Chernobyl accident renewed 
the interest in finalising the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention 
and the Paris Convention (“Joint Protocol”),172 which links the Paris and Vienna Conventions and is a 
step towards the creation of one global regime.  The Joint Protocol extends the territorial scope of the 
two conventions. It essentially grants victims in a state that is a party to the Paris Convention the same 
rights to compensation for accidents occurring in a Vienna Convention state and vice versa (i.e. it 
extends the rights under the one Convention to victims in the territory of the other Convention173). For 
example, in the event a Romanian174 Operator is liable for a nuclear incident at its nuclear installation 
in Romania and the nuclear incident results in injury to victims in Turkey,175 the victims in Turkey will 
be entitled to claim compensation from the responsible Operator in Romania. The liability of the 
Romanian Operator will be determined by the Paris Convention and the national law in Romania. It 
means that contracting states to the Paris Convention “are no longer treated as non-Contracting 
countries within the meaning of the Vienna Convention and vice versa”.176 It also ensures that only the 
Paris Convention or the Vienna Convention will apply exclusively to a nuclear incident.177 
 
One of the problems for a UK Supplier, operating in a global market, is that the UK has not 
ratified the Joint Protocol and would be viewed as a non-convention country in the event of a nuclear 
incident in a Vienna Convention country. If a UK Supplier is working for an Operator in a Vienna 
convention country, and negligently causes or contributes to a nuclear incident, a victim may be able to 
bring an action or enforce a foreign judgement against the Supplier in the English courts. The UK 
Supplier would be in the unfortunate position of not having the protection under the international 
conventions. The Supplier is unlikely to have insurance to cover this liability and could be exposed to 
an unacceptable risk.  In this situation an indemnity for nuclear liability is often agreed in the contract 
between the Supplier and Operator. The reasons for the UK not ratifying the Joint Protocol are 
probably due to the UK’s island status with all its closest neighbours being Paris Convention 
signatories (although the scale of the trans-boundary contamination following Chernobyl undermines 
this view). However, the principal reason is likely to be the lack of reciprocity between the Operator’s 











Uruguay.  The  following  countries  have  signed  the  Joint  Protocol  but  it  is  not  in  force:  (V) 





176 BUSEKIST, Otta  von  (1989) A Bridge Between Two Conventions on Civil Liability  for Nuclear 





limits of liability required under the Paris/Brussels Conventions and Vienna Convention. Victims 
suffering damage from an installation situated in a Paris Convention country (with a high compensation 
amount) have more available compensation than those who suffer damage from a Vienna Convention 
country, which are likely to have lower liability amounts. There is no adequate balance between the 
high compensation territory and the low compensation state. This could result in territories not 
increasing their compensation amounts, in order to avoid the obligation to share any compensation with 
a neighbouring state that provides less compensation. Pelzer indicates that one solution is to introduce 
the concept of reciprocity into the Joint Protocol, which he argues is entirely in line with the character 
of international treaties where the general rule is that one can only require what one is prepared to 
give.178 This exchange of reciprocal benefits would apply in relation to the compensation amounts. If, 
for example, the victim, in a Vienna Convention country suffered damage from an installation situated 
in a Paris Convention country, that victim would only be entitled to recover such sum as is recoverable 
under the regime in the Vienna Convention country.  
 
Another step which is arguably an approach towards “normalising nuclear liability law”179 is 
to introduce the concept of unlimited liability in amount. The countries that have introduced unlimited 
liability are Austria, Germany, Switzerland and Japan. There are also indications that Finland, Sweden 
and Denmark will follow.180  The Operators in these territories, who are exposed to unlimited liability, 
do not carry unlimited insurance since this is impossible to obtain but they do maintain insurance to a 
high level, which is consistent with many commercial undertakings. It is questionable whether 
unlimited liability will become the norm. In practice, not many countries have “opted for unlimited 
liability, which could easily lead to the ruin of the operator without affording any substantial 
contribution to the compensation of the damage caused.”181 However, as Currie indicates, it might well 
lead to the ruin of the Operator but it might well lead to the ruin of the victim too.182 
 
2: Convention on Supplementary Compensation (“CSC”)183 
 
The IAEA introduced the CSC in 1997 to supplement the funds available to compensate victims. The 
supplementary compensation is available through state funding. It can operate by countries either (a) 
adhering to it as a supplementary convention to the existing Paris or Vienna Conventions to which it is 
a party or (b) in the event that the state is not a party to either the Paris or Vienna Convention, they can 
adopt the CSC and implement the provisions set out in its Annex which are similar to the principles set 
out in the Paris and Vienna Conventions. The CSC sets out that compensation is split into two tiers. 
The first tier of 300m SDR minimum (which is the same as the minimum amount required under the 
Vienna Convention) is used to compensate nuclear damage184 inside and outside the installation state 
on a non-discriminatory basis. This minimum amount can be provided by the Operator and/or the state. 
The second tier is an international fund for nuclear damage inside and outside the installation state (i.e. 
for trans-boundary victims) that have not been compensated under the first tier. Fifty percent of the 
                                                 










are  Argentina,  Morocco,  Romania  and  the  USA.183  The  USA  is  the  only  ratifying  country  with 
“significant nuclear generating capacity at 111,612 MWe for the year 2009”. This is far short of 
the required 400k megawatts of the installed nuclear capacity. For the CSC to be in force it will 
require other countries, with significant generating capacity,  to ratify  it – for example,  Japan or 







international fund is to be used exclusively for trans-boundary victims.185 However, this requirement is 
removed if member states allocate more than 600m SDR available for tier one. The amount available 
under this tier is dependent on the number of member countries who have ratified the CSC. The 
member countries will be required to contribute in accordance with their nuclear capacity at the time of 
the nuclear incident.186 There is no requirement for a country to make funds available to cover the 
compensation required by tier one or two until the nuclear incident occurs. The CSC has been criticised 
in respect of the “grandfather”187 clause. This provision allows the USA to maintain its nuclear liability 
legislation without making any modifications. This is a concern because the national law in the USA is 
not consistent with the position in the international conventions. The main difference being that US law 
is based on economic channelling of liability resulting from a nuclear incident rather than legal 
channelling. Legal channelling results in the Operator being the only party who is legally liable for the 
nuclear damage to the exclusion of all other parties. Economic channelling can result in other parties 
being legally liable but the Operator being responsible for all economic consequences. The parties held 
legally liable “will be indemnified by the liability insurance coverage of the nuclear operator”.188 It has 
been argued that legal channelling is superior to economic channelling, because the latter “still has 
other companies in lawsuits even if they don’t have to pay, which has its own costs.”189 However, 
McRae comments the parties held legally liable would be “indemnified if they incur costs because of 




Table C.1: Indemnities for nuclear damage 
Title Reason 
Limitations 




The 1965 Act is not gilt edged and contains various limitations on the Operator’s liability. Any 
indemnity should therefore be drafted so it is independent of the 1965 Act. The limitations include: 
• the limits on liability, in amount (section 18) and in time (section 15) may not be viewed as 
satisfactory;   
• the possibility that a Supplier could be deemed partly liable, if the Supplier were partly responsible, 
for a nuclear occurrence where the Operator can demonstrate that such partial responsibility is 
attributable to something outside the Operator’s statutory duties (section 12(3)); 
• the Operator not being strictly liable when hostile acts cause the breach of duty (section 13(4)); 
• there is also a low risk that the nuclear site license may be revoked or surrendered at any time 
(section 5(1)), or there may be a defect in licence granted, where the section 7 duty would not then 
apply. 
Gaps in the 
1965 Act 
 
• There is a possibility that the Supplier is deemed to have accepted liability for nuclear damage to 
the Operator’s property (which includes the installation itself and any other property on site used in 
connection with the construction or operation of a nuclear installation). This possibility should be 
expressly excluded or, to negate any possibility of the Supplier unwittingly accepting liability for 
property damage elsewhere in the contract, the Supplier could use words like “notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary” in the indemnity.  
• There are various categories of damage (as detailed in the 2004 Paris Protocol) that are currently 
outside the 1965 Act that should be covered by the nuclear indemnity (e.g. costs of reinstating an 
                                                 
185  Pelzer  states  that  “there  was  considerable  opposition  against  this  provision  during  the 
negotiations  of  the  CSC  and  delegates  said  that  a  victim  is  a  victim  and  there  should  be  no 
discrimination among victims. Pelzer, N., supra note 48 at p. 380 (footnote 52) 
186 McRae sets out that “90% of the contributions come from nuclear power generating countries 
on  the  basis  of  their  installed  nuclear  capacity,  while  the  remaining  portion  comes  from  all 
member countries on the basis of their United Nations rate of assessment” and because nuclear 
power generating countries have high United Nations  rates of assessment,  this  formula  should 




clause  contradicts  this  ambition by  creating  a  loophole  that  allows  the USA  to  avoid having  to 
harmonise its national law to conform with the international regime. Pelzer, N., supra note 48 at 
p. 381. 






impaired environment; economic loss from a direct economic interest in the environment; and costs 




• If the Supplier is providing services/equipment to foreign nuclear installations, there may be risks 
associated with the installation state not being a party to the Paris Convention. The Supplier will 
therefore not benefit from channelization under the international regime. In such a situation it may 
also be prudent for claimants to bring compensation claims against as many defendants as possible 
which may be a particular concern for the Supplier that has greater disposable assets than the 
Operator. Victims and/or the Operator may therefore decide to sue the Supplier by making the 
claim, or enforcing it, against the Supplier in the UK. The claims may also be brought in a country 
that is more sympathetic to nuclear damage claims or more likely to award higher levels of 
compensation or punitive damages than the courts of the installation state.  
• The Supplier working in the UK or another Paris Convention country is still not wholly free of risk. 
Nuclear damage could occur in a non-Paris Convention country. The national law of this country is 
unlikely to recognise the channelization or jurisdiction principles set out in the conventions. The 
Supplier could then be sued by victims in such country with the judgement being enforced in the 
UK. This is exacerbated by the Enforcement Treaties under which many countries have agreed 
reciprocal arrangements for enforcing judgements. For this risk to be avoided, the installation state 
and all neighbouring countries need to be party to a liability convention with appropriate national 
laws together with the UK ratifying the Joint Protocol.  
• The installation state’s national law may present its own risks (e.g. in India - the Operator is likely 
to have rights of recourse against the Supplier if its equipment/services are defective; Russia - the 
position is less clear whether the Operator requires financial security, is exclusively liable or has a 
maximum liability; (c) Switzerland - no convention is yet in force; or USA which is effectively a 
non-convention country (e) Canada -  there is a relatively low limitations at CAD$75million or 
£47m/€56m and ten years). The Operator’s indemnity should provide the Supplier with the 




• Suppliers do not generally insure for nuclear liability (in fact Supplier’s insurance policies usually 
contain exclusions for radioactive contamination) whereas the Operator has to maintain insurance or 
other financial security. If Suppliers did insure, the parties would be maintaining insurance for the 
same risk and the cost of such double insurance is likely to be passed to the Operator anyway. 
Although nuclear liability insurance may be available to Suppliers at a premium, it is likely 
insurance would be for limited coverage and in certain circumstances it might not be available at all. 
Given the extent of damage which a single, serious nuclear incident could cause, and the vast 
number of claims which might then arise, Supplier’s maintaining such insurance cannot realistically 
offer a solution.  
• Operators sometimes ask Suppliers to accept liability for a threshold amount of a nuclear damage 
claim. The amount of such threshold often becomes a commercial argument. If Suppliers decide 
against insurance or it is not available, they may decide to self-insure. This approach may remove 
minor or nuisance claims or even be an attempt by the Operator to cover any excess or deductible. 
However, the concern is that the Operator is essentially asking Suppliers to give up a statutory 
protection and take on liability which Parliament has decided by statute should be the Operator’s 
liability. It is also a liability that only the Operator should insure.  
Vicarious 
Liability 
There is a risk that the Supplier will be found liable for nuclear damage as a result of such damage being 
intentionally caused by the Supplier’s employee. This appears to be a low risk unless the employee was 
acting under the instructions of the employing Supplier.  
Nuclear 
new build 
in the UK 
All of the proposed NPPs are on adjacent sites to existing UK nuclear installations that are operational 
or being decommissioned. The cost of a new NPP has been estimated at more than €5 billion. This 
presents new risks for Suppliers. In the event of a nuclear incident during decommissioning or at one of 
the operational installations resulting in damage to a new NNP, the cost of such damage is likely to be 
far in excess of the available nuclear liability insurance or the funds available under the Brussels 
Convention. It is also likely that political pressure will result in accident victims being compensated 
ahead of the funders/owners of the new NPPs. Funders/owners may attempt to pass some of this risk 
down the supply chain and is a risk Suppliers may need to consider.  
Supply 
chain 
• The indemnity should enure for the benefit of sub-suppliers at any tier in the supply chain. This is 
logical because liability is channelled to the Operator who is, by law, obligated to maintain insurance 
or financial security and strictly liable. Nevertheless, Operators sometimes request the Supplier to 
provide the indemnity to its sub-supplier on the basis that it has a back-to-back indemnity from the 
Operator. This presents risks for the Supplier because it may be required to compensate the sub-
supplier without first receiving the corresponding compensation from the Operator. The risk for the 
Supplier is that the Operator’s limits of liability and financial security may be exhausted and the 
Operator may not have the financial wherewithal to honour its indemnity. The Supplier would then be 
left with the burden of indemnifying its sub-suppliers without any insurance coverage or 
indemnification from the Operator. The absence of an indemnity may also create unnecessary 
challenges for the Supplier in finding suitably qualified and experienced sub-suppliers. 
• In the event the Operator indemnifies the supply chain the Supplier should consider whether the rights 
of third parties to enforce contractual provisions have been excluded. In the UK, the Contract (Rights 
of Third Parties) Act 1999 (“the 1999 Act”), allows third parties to rely on clauses in contracts to 
which they are not a party. The implication being that a third party can enforce a positive obligation, 
such as an indemnity, in the contract. Sub-suppliers can rely on an indemnity clause where the parties 
to the contract cannot show that they did not intend the third party to benefit from the indemnity. The 
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indemnified third party can be identified either expressly by name, as a member of a class or as 
answering to a particular description.  If the parties want to extend the benefit of the contract to a sub-
supplier or affiliate this should be expressly set out in the contract. In the UK it is common for 
contracts to exclude such third party rights. This type of provision often appears in the contract boiler 
plate as standard and can easily be overlooked. It is important that the Supplier makes the indemnity an 
exception to any such clause excluding third parties’ rights to enforce contractual provisions.  
 
